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Abstract
This paper presents a case study of large- and small-scale irrigators negotiating for access to water from Nduruma River in 
the Pangani River Basin, Tanzania. The paper shows that despite the existence of a formal statutory water permit system, 
all users need to conform to the existing local rules in order to secure access to water. The spatial geography of Nduruma is 
such that smallholder farmers are located upstream and downstream, while large-scale irrigators are in the midstream part 
of the sub-catchment. There is not enough water in the river to satisfy all demands. The majority of the smallholder farmers 
currently access water under local arrangements, but large-scale irrigators have obtained state-issued water use permits. 
To access water the estates adopt a variety of strategies: they try to claim water access by adhering to state water law; they 
engage with the downstream smallholder farmers and negotiate rotational allocation; and/or they band with downstream 
farmers to secure more water from upstream farmers. Estates that were successful in securing their water access were those 
that engaged with the local system and negotiated a fair rotational water-sharing arrangement. By adopting this strategy, 
the estates not only avoid conflict with the poor downstream farmers but also gain social reputation, increasing chances of 
cooperative behaviours from the farmers towards their hydraulic infrastructure investments. Cooperative behaviours by the 
estates may also be due to their dependence on local labour. We further find diverging perspectives on the implementation 
of the state water use permits – not only between the local and state forms of water governance, but also between the differ-
ing administrative levels of government. The local governments are more likely to spend their limited resources on ‘keeping 
the peace’ rather than on enforcing the water law. At the larger catchment scale, however, the anonymity between users 
makes it more difficult to initiate and maintain cooperative arrangements.
Keywords: water rights, legitimacy, conflict, subsistence irrigated agriculture, Tanzania
Introduction
Increased water scarcity leads to competition between water 
users, large and small, up- and downstream. Conflict may arise 
because upstream users abstract most of the water and leave 
their downstream neighbours with scarcity. To solve water 
allocation conflicts, many governments attempt to formalise 
the water rights system – users are granted rights to use a 
certain amount of water, at a particular location and duration. 
However, the formalisation of water rights may also provide 
opportunities for wealthier, more powerful, and better-con-
nected users to manipulate registration to serve their own inter-
ests (Bruns, 2007). In addition, since sources of water rights 
are multiple and often conflicting, formalisation may lead to 
struggles over whose water right is legitimate. Smallholder 
farmers may base their water claims on customary rights and 
their historical investments in water infrastructure, while new 
users (e.g. large-scale irrigators and cities) use state-issued 
water rights to gain control of water sources. 
This paper presents the struggles for water access and con-
trol in Nduruma River, upper Pangani River Basin, Tanzania. 
The present water rights system in Tanzania builds on water 
law established by the colonial authorities in the early 20th 
century – a law specifically designed to limit use among native 
inhabitants while at the same time securing access to water 
for European settlers (Lein and Tagseth, 2009). In addition 
to the colonial-induced water access asymmetry, more recent 
increased water demand has led to fierce competition in the 
Nduruma sub-catchment. This increasing water demand is 
partly caused by the revitalization of coffee estates by both 
local and international private capital. Several of these estates 
are relics of the German and British colonisers (cf. Spear, 
1997). Most of the coffee estates have been converted into large 
flower farms by a new group of white farmers, making the 
present social-geography a mirror image of the colonial past. 
The area which was once called the ‘iron ring of alienated land’ 
(Spear, 1997), is called today the ‘plastic valley’ because of its 
numerous greenhouses. Old estates were also the centre of the 
protracted struggles over water and land resources between the 
local people (Meru and Arusha), white settlers, and the colo-
nial administration (Spear, 1997). Just as in the colonial time, 
present-day water users relying on Nduruma River must oper-
ate in a plural legal context that is made up of locally-evolved 
water-sharing practices and the water rights system crafted by 
the national government.
This paper illustrates how new commercial estate owners 
(mostly international companies) in this sub-catchment must 
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adapt to local concepts of legitimate water rights to survive. 
They must accept the fact that acquiring state water rights does 
not automatically translate into legitimacy at the local level. 
To understand the dynamic of the struggles for water rights 
in the sub-catchment we develop a conceptual framework 
based on Boelens echelons of water rights analysis (Boelens, 
2008; Zwarteveen et al., 2005) and the concept of legitimacy 
(Bodansky, 1999; 2007). 
It is important at this point to clarify our use and prefer-
ence for the terminology of institutions – informal, formal, 
customary, modern, indigenous, local, bureaucratic and state-
led. Similarly to Komakech et al. (2011), we use the term local 
to mean farmer-initiated water allocation rules that evolved 
over time. We prefer the term ‘local’ over the commonly used 
‘informal’, because access and use of irrigation canals is often 
strongly regulated and enforced and combines both customary 
and modern elements. Similarly, we use ‘statutory’ to signify 
government-sanctioned water management rules. We put 
particular emphasis on the origin of the rules instead of stating 
their perceived false formality or modernity (see Komakech 
et al., 2011). Formal rules may also have informal origins and 
calling them modern wrongly suggests that they are better than 
traditional institutions.
The paper is organised as follows: The conceptual frame-
work used to explore water rights struggles in the Nduruma 
sub-catchment is followed by a description of the case study 
catchment. The water governance context in the Nduruma sub-
catchment is discussed, after which cases of rights struggles 
and negotiation processes are presented, focusing on the role 
of large-scale irrigators in local water allocation systems. This 
is followed by a discussion of the research findings in light of 
water rights theory and formalisation. Finally, by way of con-
clusion, some lessons for the development of catchment water 
allocation systems are provided.
Framework: water rights, struggles and control
Property rights define an individual’s rights, privileges and 
associated limitations of a specific resource use; allocation of 
property rights affects the efficiency of resource use (Schlager 
and Ostrom, 1992). According to Bromley (1997), property 
provides some benefit streams, while a right to property offers 
security over that benefit stream. A property right defines a 
relationship between individuals (or groups) with respect to the 
use of a particular resource and the benefits this use generates. 
To have a property right is to have the capacity to require some 
authority system to defend your interest against the interests 
of others (Bromley, 1997: 50). Because of its vital, rivalry and 
non-excludability characteristics, water is a unique resource, 
the management of which requires a suitable set of institutional 
arrangements. A water right is therefore often composed of a 
set or ‘bundle’ of graduated privileges that are assigned to dif-
ferent social entities (Bruns, 2007; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992; 
Shi, 2006). This defines who is entitled to a certain amount of 
water, at a particular time and location, during scarcity. 
The sources of water rights are multiple and dynamic. They 
often take many forms at many levels of water management. 
Water allocation is not necessarily a matter of formal licences 
to abstract water or contractual commitments for water deliv-
ery, but also local understandings such as taking turns to 
use water, and when and where irrigation water may be used 
(Bruns, 2007). According to Bruns (2007), real access to water 
depends on how water is allocated at multiple levels, among 
larger jurisdictions such as nations, states, provinces, and 
districts and among organisations and individuals extracting 
water from rivers and aquifers, as well as on the crucial details 
of water distribution within irrigation systems. Water rights 
may be implicit in the design of structures, and asserted in 
decisions about guarding, maintaining, or modifying irrigation 
infrastructure (Bruns, 2007; Lankford and Beale, 2007). Even 
when water rights are formally stipulated, such entitlements 
must still be translated into seasonal and daily decisions about 
withdrawing water. 
With increasing water scarcity, most governments find 
themselves walking a tight line. To create, maintain or restore 
order, governments assert full ownership of water, and, in 
theory, also the sole authority to determine who is entitled to 
water at a particular point in time (Bruns and Meinzen-Dick, 
2001; Molle, 2004). Water users (individual or groups) are 
granted ‘official’ licences or permits to use a certain amount 
of water, at a particular location and duration. Domestic users 
may be granted access to water (mainly for drinking) without a 
permit. The duration of rights may be permanent, for a number 
of years, or made conditional upon productive use, but does 
not usually take into account hydrological variability (Molle, 
2004). Common belief is that the state’s prescriptive water right 
is legitimate and legal. However, alongside the statutory rights 
system are local norms and customs that mediate day-to-day 
access to water.
By contrast, local water rights (based on customs and 
norms), are locally developed and adapted through step-by-step 
negotiation between the users – often building on a pre-existing 
rights system. As described by Molle (2004), the process of 
negotiation occurs at several nested levels in a river basin: 
• At the river level, during dry seasons there may be insuffi-
cient flow to meet all demands and this gives way to negoti-
ated rules for sharing between user groups (e.g., irrigation 
canals using one river), and they are constantly redefined. 
• Within an irrigation canal, users’ participation in mainte-
nance may be instrumental in the definition of allocation 
rules in case supply is unable to meet demand.
Locally-negotiated water rights are often sanctioned by the 
authority vested in the decision-making body (e.g. river com-
mittees) and by the social recognition of these structures. Also 
of importance is the fact that at the level of an irrigation canal, 
water rights are often tied to labour investment in the hydraulic 
property which enhances one’s claim to water access (Coward, 
1986). 
Water rights claims are often contested. As depicted in  
Fig. 1, the struggle includes competition over who gets access 
to water, infrastructure and material means (resources); contest 
over the formulation and contents of water rights and opera-
tional norms (rules); struggle over decision-making authority 
and the legitimacy of rights systems (regulatory control); and 
the diverging discourses that defend or challenge particular 
water policies, normative constructs and water hierarchies 
(regimes of representation) (Boelens, 2008).
The 4 components are involved simultaneously and chained 
together in particular ways, establishing how water is distrib-
uted, how humans and non-humans are ordered in socio-techni-
cal hierarchies, how this is legitimated by moral and symbolic 
order, etc. (Boelens, 2008; Mehta, 2007). Such alignments take 
place in ways that either strengthen or challenge the status quo. 
In this way, water rights struggles are at the centre of power 
relations. Power is used here to mean relational effects aris-
ing out of one’s location advantage, access to other material 
resources and/or psychological strength (Piccione and Razin, 
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2009). Power relations generate key features of water rights 
content, distribution and legitimacy, and, in turn, water rights 
in action reproduce or restructure power relations (Boelens, 
2008). For instance, acts of resistance against a dominant actor 
(e.g. attacks on estates intakes) may subvert power relations 
between the actors and this in turns affect water control.
In sum, water rights stand at the centre of struggles over 
legitimacy. Legitimacy describes the formal and informal ways 
in which processes, policies, structures and agents are vali-
dated and consequently empowered (Gearey and Jeffrey, 2006). 
The challenge is in equating legitimacy to legality. Legitimacy 
has both a normative quality and a social dimension – it is not 
only a reason for action but also the justification for action 
(Bodansky, 2007; Gearey and Jeffrey, 2006). Bodansky (2007) 
argues that legitimacy is a much broader concept than legal-
ity in at least 3 ways: (1) legality is one possible justification 
of authority, but not the only criterion in assessing authority 
of institutions (e.g., a certain use of water may be illegal yet 
considered legitimate by some); (2) exercise of authority can 
exist outside a legal system and still raise issues of legitimacy 
(e.g. traditional leaders); and (3) legitimacy relates not simply 
to compliance, but to the justification of authority more gener-
ally. He argues further that an institution may be considered 
legitimate when users think that it serves their self-interest. 
We use the above conceptualisation of water rights struggles to 
explore the dynamic of water access and distribution between 
large-scale irrigators and smallholder farmers in the Nduruma 
sub-catchment.
The complex nature of accessing water can be aptly illus-
trated by the case of Nduruma River.  In this catchment small 
and large-scale irrigators mediate their differing perspectives 
because they share one and the same source of water.
Research methods and case study  
sub-catchment
Research methods
The objectives of this research were to describe and analyse 
water-sharing agreements among and between various users 
of the Nduruma River. We were particularly interested in how 
each user’s unique situation affected water use and cooperation 
with other users. Our consideration of situation included ques-
tions of: location (upstream or downstream); political influence; 
size of demand and/or production; type of intake and/or irriga-
tion technology employed; and whether the user was foreign or 
local. To achieve these objectives, we first needed to identify 
all users, their location, and intake points. To identify the users 
and their networks, we followed the Nduruma River down-
stream, mapped the hydraulic infrastructures tapping the water 
source (predominantly irrigation canals referred to here as 
furrows), and followed them back to their owners. 
Once each furrow was located and attributed to either a vil-
lage or an estate, we conducted interviews with various stake-
holders and irrigation committees. We started group interviews 
with village furrow committees: 7 members, including the 
village chairmen, each from Makasuro sub-village, Nduruma, 
Moivaro and Madawe villages; and 14 members from Manyire 
village. Discussions with these groups were conducted around a 
similar set of questions to determine current norms in use, how 
water is allocated to each furrow, and how this is transformed 
into water access for individual members of a furrow. We also 
investigated what the village leaders thought about how their 
water use influenced downstream users, and how their supply 
was affected by those upstream. 
We also met with at least one representative from each of 
the estates located in the mid-zone of the Nduruma River: the 
owner of Old River Farm; the former owner of Gomba Estate; 
the farm manager of Dekker Bruins; the director and irrigation 
manager of Arusha Blooms; and the environmental and fertiga-
tion officers of Kiliflora. Questions asked of these individuals 
were similar to those asked of the villagers, such as deter-
mining if their water supply met their demand and how they 
affected and/or were affected by surrounding village users. In 
addition, representatives were asked to describe their relation-
ship with surrounding villagers and their strategies to secure 
access to water. 
Interviews were also conducted with officials from the local 
governments and basin authority to get a broader understand-
ing of the issue: the Meru District Irrigation Officer; the Water 
Officer at the Pangani Basin Water Office; the Nduruma Ward 
Executive Officer; and the Sokon II Ward Office Chairman. We 
asked them to describe the current state of water sharing (or 
conflict) and how state-issued water rights were influencing the 
situation. 
For those villages that had River Committees in place, 
we met and conducted interviews with the committees’ head 
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secretary of the Nduruma and Manyire River Committees. 
The committee members were asked to give their own per-
spective on the questions listed above. In addition, they were 
asked general questions about the committee itself: why it was 
formed and whose idea or initiative it was, how a furrow group 
can become a member of the River Committee, the specific role 
of this committee, especially with respect to water allocation, 
its spatial span of control, management structure and election 
of representatives and leaders, and its relationship with estates 
and estate managers.
Nduruma River
The Nduruma River, located in the upper parts of the Pangani 
River Basin, originates in a protected forest reserve near the 
summit of Mount Meru and is fed by small tributaries (Songota 
and Manyire being the main ones) and springs along its course 
(Fig. 2). Rainfall is bimodal with short rains (vuli) from November 
to January and long rains (masika) falling from March to June. 
Eight administrative wards of the Arumeru district depend 
at least in part on the Nduruma River at some time in the 
year: Bangata, Nkoanrua, Sokon II, Mlangarini, Nduruma, 
Moshono, Kikwe, and Mbuguni. These wards can be divided 
into 3 groups based roughly on altitude and composition of the 
water users – highlands, midlands, and lowlands (Table 1).
The highlands begin below the forest reserve and end 
just above the Arusha-Moshi highway. Irrigation has been 
practiced for more than 200 years in the highland zone. The 
villages in this zone are Midawe, Bangata, and Nkoanrua. 
The western bank of the river is mainly occupied by Arusha 
people and the eastern bank by the Meru people (Spear, 1997). 
The main source of income for this area is the cultivation of 
maize and bananas, coffee, pyrethrum and round potatoes. 
The most upstream village of Midawe has several furrows that 
in fact draw from springs and the river Songota, a tributary 














Nduruma sub-catchment, villages and irrigation 
canal intakes
Table 1
Agro-ecological zones of Nduruma sub-catchment





Forest reserve Above 1 800 m ~ 1 400 Forest reserve, wildlife, lumbering, mining. National park
Highland 1 400-1 800 m ~1 000 Subsistence agriculture (major crops: coffee, bananas, sugarcane, yams, maize, 
vegetables, and sweet potatoes). Supplemental irrigation practiced but changes 
to full irrigation during dry seasons. Livestock are stalled – mainly dairy cattle. 
Water used for domestic, irrigation, livestock and Arusha municipal supply
Midland 1 000-1 400 m ~500 Referred to as “Plastic Valley,” the area is under intensive agriculture. Crops 
include coffee, banana, maize, beans, horticultural crops and export flowers. 
Originally white settlers’ coffee estates but now changing into larger commer-
cial flower growers (majority international investors). Competition over water is 
intense.
Lowland Below 800 m ~ 400 Subsistence agriculture and livestock. Receives low rainfall, highly affected by 
upstream water use. Major crops: tobacco, rice, beans, maize, and vegetables. 
Livestock are free-range, mainly own by pastoral Maasai. 
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furrows. Due to the large population, there is a large shortage 
of land in this zone, and this leads to degradation of the water 
sources and river banks, as people are forced to farm any avail-
able land.
The midland zone is roughly defined by the current 
Arusha-Moshi highway and the Old Arusha -Moshi dirt road. 
It overlaps with the area that locals call the ‘plastic-valley’ 
because of the huge number of (plastic-roofed) greenhouses, 
belonging to commercial farmers, which dot the landscape. 
Formerly, the area was used for coffee production and formed 
what Spear (1997) called the ‘iron ring of land alienation’ 
around the base of Mount Meru. The coffee estates around 
Mount Meru were not nationalised by the independent govern-
ment of Tanzania (Baffes, 2003; Spear, 1997). These estates 
are foreign-owned and depend on Nduruma River for intensive 
irrigation to grow flowers and vegetable seeds needed for the 
international market. Smallholder farmers are the minority in 
the midlands, both in terms of their number and their landhold-
ings. Manyire tributary originates from this zone and is being 
used by the estates and surrounding villages.
The lowland zone of the Nduruma valley is semi-arid. 
Until recently, the area was used for commercial sisal pro-
duction and livestock grazing. Currently, the main economic 
activities include livestock keeping and subsistence agriculture. 
The majority of users are smallholder farmers who predomi-
nantly grow maize, beans, rice, tomatoes, vegetables and 
fruits. Some of the villages farthest downstream have been 
recently populated by people moving from different parts of the 
country. The most upstream portion of this zone also overlaps 
with the ‘plastic valley’, and thus there is a fair number of 
large-scale irrigators here as well, clustered just below the 
Old Arusha-Moshi road. The villages in this zone relying on 
Nduruma water are Mlangarini, Manyire, Mzimuni, Marurani, 
and Nduruma. 
Water governance in Nduruma
Irrigation along the Nduruma River dates back more than 200 
years (Spear, 1997), but intensive water use only started to pick 
up pace during the colonial period, when white commercial 
farmers settled in the area, and began using the same water 
resources as the indigenous population. A map dating back to 
1959 provides an illustration of the land use situation shortly 
before independence. This map was obtained from Pamoja 
archives and was made by ‘J.N.S.’ on 10 April 1959. Only the 
initials of the author are indicated, and we suspect that the map 
was made through a directive from the colonial administration 
(see Spear, 1997). The majority of the furrows are in the high-
lands, and are labelled ‘African.’ Below them, in the midland, 
there are fewer, but longer furrows, the majority of which 
are labelled ‘European.’ Below these (lowland), only a small 
number of short furrows can be seen, which are once again 
labelled ‘African.’ The situation is not much different today; 
the present geography is such that smallholder farmers are 
located upstream and downstream while the midstream zone is 
mainly occupied by large-scale irrigators growing flowers for 
European markets. This spatial geography shapes the nature 
of water governance in the catchment. This section briefly 
describes, first, the state-sanctioned water right governance 
system in Nduruma River; second, the local water governance 
arrangements; and third, the functioning of the locally-devel-
oped Nduruma River Committee.
State-sanctioned water right governance in Nduruma
The German and British colonisers first introduced statutory 
water law in what is now mainland Tanzania in the early 20th 
century; all water was declared a state resource and the water 
right permit system was introduced (Lein and Tagseth, 2009; 
Maganga, 2003). The water rights system was particularly 
introduced to curtail natives’ water use and secure water for 
white commercial settlers who had interest in agricultural 
intensification in the highlands (see Komakech et al., 2011). In 
the Nduruma sub-catchment, local farmers were dispossessed 
of their lands and water resources (Spear, 1997). Subsequent 
amendments have since been made to the Water Utilization 
(Control and Regulation) Act in 1948, 1959, 1974, 1981, 1996, 
1997 and 2009. A volumetric water use fee was first introduced 
in the 1974 Water Utilization (Control and Regulation) Act. 
The Tanzanian government recently reformed its water sector: 
in 2002 a new National Water Policy was put in place (United 
Republic of Tanzania, 2002). Under this policy, water belongs 
to the state, and all water users with an intention to abstract 
surface or underground water must acquire water rights from 
a designated basin water authority (basin water board/office). 
However, with the exception of volumetric water use fees, the 
current water rights system is still similar in many aspects to 
the colonial water law. A basin water board may grant or refuse 
water rights to any person or groups. If granted, the water 
right specifies the purpose, volumetric amount allowed, dura-
tion of the right, and the source (United Republic of Tanzania, 
2009). A permit holder may, with the consent of the basin water 
board, temporarily lease his/her use right to anyone, and for 
 
Figure 3
Existing water use structures with and without state-issued water 
rights in Nduruma River and their measured dry season water 
abstractions, November 2003. (Source: PBWO archive)
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any duration, provided that the duration of the permit is not 
exceeded. Nothing in any water use permit granted implies 
any guarantee that the quality and quantity of water referred to 
is, or shall be, available. Permits may be declared by the basin 
board as appurtenant to land described in the permit. However, 
state-issued water rights seem to lead to over-abstraction in 
many places. In the Rufiji basin, for example, issuing water 
rights led to over-abstraction and increased competition as 
users argued that acquiring a state water right is synonymous 
with owning the water (see Van Koppen et al., 2007). The prob-
lem is that ‘water rights’ was translated to Swahili as haki za 
kumiliki maji (water property rights) – which made users think 
that acquiring a permit conferred full ownership rights. The 
government tried to address this problem with the new Water 
Act (Control and Regulation 2009) by redefining the phrase 
‘water use permit’, using the Swahili haki ya kutumia maji 
(right to use water). In addition current water use permits are 
issued to users specifying a fixed flow rate, determined based 
on the assumption that an average supply exists (Lankford and 
Beale, 2007; Van Koppen et al., 2007). However, in the Pangani 
and other basins in Tanzania rainfall and hence water supply is 
highly variable, which makes the state allocation inappropriate, 
especially during low flows (dry seasons or during droughts).
The Pangani Basin Water Board (PBWO), through its exec-
utive basin office, is responsible for allocating all water rights 
in the basin of which Nduruma is a sub-catchment. PBWO 
maintains a database of all users in the basin and handles all 
new requests. Most of the large-scale irrigators along Nduruma 
acquired their water rights during the colonial time, but these 
were revised by PBWO in 2003 to accommodate Arusha City’s 
water demand (Komakech et al., 2010). Figure 3 is a sketch of 
water right status and measured dry season abstractions along 
Nduruma River.
Through their system of indirect rule, the British also cre-
ated the conditions for a pluralist system of water governance 
in Tanzania (Spear, 1997). They created Crown Land to be 
governed by statutory law and Native Reserves (land occupied 
by the Africans) to be governed by local law. Ever since the 
colonial time, customary rights in the Pangani River Basin 
have coevolved with statutory water rights.
Local water governance in Nduruma sub-catchment
The furrows in the highlands each have a committee, com-
posed of a chairman, secretary, and members. For most of the 
furrow committees there is also a ‘council’ of elders who act as 
advisors. The committees are mostly concerned with organis-
ing the youth of the community into a maintenance schedule 
for the infrastructure. The furrow committees generally meet 
every 3 months and elections for membership are held every 4 
years, at the annual village committee meetings. In the dry sea-
son, when water is scarcer, there is a need to precisely allocate 
the water amongst the various farmers (via a rotational system). 
Most of the highland furrows drawing from the main stem of 
the Nduruma River have metal intake gates, but furrows draw-
ing from springs and Songota tributary have no lockable gates. 
However, all metal gates were found locked in the fully opened 
position, or intentionally destroyed in order to abstract more 
water, a sign that they are not used to regulate water allocation. 
All highland furrows abstract water simultaneously with no 
turn-taking enforced even during the dry season.
Highland furrow committees claimed that there is no con-
flict amongst the villages themselves. Although some down-
stream villages use these same furrows the highland furrow 
committees never organise meetings with them. Nkoanrua’s 
furrow chairman explained that the reason why they have never 
met with downstream users such as Moivaro Village is because 
these villages tap springs which ensure domestic water sup-
ply. Because of this domestic supply, downstream villagers are 
believed to receive enough water to survive. The highlanders 
do not seem to bother whether or not the downstream villagers 
receive enough water to produce sufficient food and maintain 
their livelihoods. 
In the midland area, only furrows used by smallholder 
farmers have committees with structures similar to those of 
the highlands. Large-scale irrigators do not use committees 
to manage their furrows. During the rainy season, farmers in 
Moivaro, for instance, claim that they don’t irrigate so they 
only use intra-village allocation schedules in the dry season. In 
May and June, the furrow committee is in charge of repairing 
the furrows that were damaged, in preparation for the coming 
dry season. The furrows are typically silted up during the rains 
and the intakes get damaged. There is an annual fee of around 
2 000 to  3 000 Tsh (1.34 - 2.00 USD) collected from each plot 
(shamba) in the village for completing the furrow repairs.
Lowland furrows have committees with the following 
composition: 3 water distributors, 3 advisors, 2 water guards, 
a chairman, treasurer, and secretary. These committees are 
responsible for water allocation to individual farmers, routine 
maintenance, and resolving resource conflict. The chairman, 
secretary, and advisors determine the day-to-day water alloca-
tion schedule. Individuals are assigned water for approximately 
2 hours each. Despite this planning, villagers still steal water 
along the way. There is a 5 000 Tsh (3.34 USD) fine for water 
theft, which is handled within the village government system.
Local catchment wide governance structure: 
Nduruma River Committee
There is no overall water management institution for the 
Nduruma sub-catchment that is recognised by the Pangani 
Basin Water Board. This notwithstanding, the allocation 
of water between the midlands (mainly large-scale farm-
ers) and lowlands is being managed by the Nduruma River 
Committee. The villages that actively participate in the 
River Committee are Mlangarini, Manyire, Mzimuni, 
Marurani, and Nduruma. According to the current Board 
Chairman, in the past there was sufficient water, but during 
droughts or dry seasons, elders would meet and agree on 
allocation schedules. There was one elder whose role was 
to guard the river. He would follow the river upstream and 
negotiate with upstream farmers. Between 1962 and 1974, 
an extreme drought occurred and the idea of the commit-
tee emerged. Leaders of the individual furrows would meet 
after examining the levels of available water in the Nduruma 
River and then agree on allocation schedules. However, 
the discussion of allocation schedules in ‘traditional’ times 
never travelled beyond Ambureni/Moivaro Village to the 
highlands. The Nduruma River Committee in its current 
structure was initiated in 1999 by smallholder and large 
commercial farmers with the support of the Arumeru 
District Commissioner. This is also the year when the first 
formal elections occurred for the chairman and secretary. 
Currently, every furrow in the mid- and lowlands is rep-
resented on the Nduruma River Committee, normally by the 
chairman and secretary of the furrow. Within each furrow 
there is an election every 3 years for these positions. If there 
is a problem, new members are selected to replace old ones. 
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Among these representatives, a chairman and a secretary of 
the Board are elected. In addition, the security guards from 
each of the furrows attend the Board meetings, but do not vote. 
Representatives from each of the estates attend committee 
meetings as well – normally the estate farm managers or irriga-
tion officers, who are always native Tanzanians. The current 
chairman of the River Committee is from Mlangarini Village 
and the secretary from Nduruma Village. 
The Nduruma River Committee is responsible for setting 
the allocation schedules for each of the main villages as well 
as commercial estate furrows. If it is discovered that a furrow/
estate is violating the agreement and abstracting outside of its 
allowed time, the Board levies a fine on the responsible party. 
In the case of the estates, the fine is levied in the name of the 
estate representative to the Board, usually the irrigation man-
ager. Stephen Gregory from Tanzania Flowers explained that 
in his case the estate would cover the penalty. In the case of the 
village furrows, the fine is levied against the furrow chairman 
regardless of who made the irrigation offence. 
Under local water-use bylaws, the punishment for stealing 
water was to supply a sheep or goat to be eaten by the clan. 
Since 1999 the fine has been levied in Tanzania shillings. The 
fine for estates was raised in January 2009 from 100 000 Tsh to 
200 000 Tsh (67-134 USD). The fine for village farmers caught 
stealing is variable and usually a much smaller sum. This pun-
ishment is often relegated to the individual furrow committee 
to manage. In theory, if a villager is unable to pay his fine he is 
expected to forfeit a section of his land, but in practice this has 
never occurred. 
There are no registration or membership fees for being a 
part of the River Committee. Most of the large estates make 
voluntary payments when asked. These cash allotments go 
toward small purchases such as refreshments for meetings. The 
River Committee has no bank account and thus no mechanism 
for storing large amounts of money. Nelson, from Dekker Bruin 
expressed his frustration concerning this matter: ‘Sometimes 
[the estates] are sent a request for funds, or someone asks for 
[help with] transport to the [meetings]. The Board should really 
have an account. There are silly problems like sometimes 
the chairman fails to phone because he has run out of credit.’ 
Because the requests for financial support are informal and 
sporadic, estates have no way of knowing if they are sharing 
the financial burden. It is apparent that Tanzania Flowers and 
Dekker Bruins have borne the brunt of the costs. The Nduruma 
River Committee has no headquarters or office and meetings 
are generally held in an open field on the property of Dekker 
Bruins.
Finally, Manyire villagers claim that they have a River 
Committee for Manyire river. The committee reportedly was 
elected in the year 2000 during a general assembly attended by 
the villages of Manyire, Maji moto, Karangai and Makasoru. 
Apparently Nambala and Kikwe village were not part of the 
meeting. Nambala village is in conflict with the other villages 
and does not recognise Manyire River Committee.
Legitimacy and struggles over water access and 
control
The situation in Nduruma is challenging for the large-scale irri-
gators who want to invest in an environment where the state’s 
water law is deemed legal and legitimate at all levels. All large-
scale irrigators in the sub-catchment have state-issued water 
rights (also referred to as ‘official’ water rights). Although some 
smallholder groups have also acquired state water rights on 
their irrigation canals, the allocation of water ‘on the ground’ 
is being done according to local rules. This leads to struggles 
between the smallholder farmers, who appeal to customary 
principles and the large-scale irrigators, who want to adhere to 
the state’s statutory water law. In addition to the struggle over 
water access and control, the large-scale irrigators also invest 
in water-related infrastructure to secure access to water. The 
technological innovations include the use of a ‘high-tech’ drip 
irrigation system, rainwater harvesting from the greenhouse 
roofs, storage infrastructure and boreholes. We present in this 
section 3 cases of conflict and cooperation between the estates 
and smallholder farmers: first, Gomba Estate that claims that 
only the official legal right is legitimate; second, Enza Zaden 
that attempts to mediate conflict between Manyire users; and 
third, a group of estates that agrees on rotational allocation 
with smallholder farmers.
Contested official water law: case of Gomba estate
One notorious example of conflict between the Nduruma River 
Committee and a foreign-owned commercial farm is the case of 
Gomba Estate. In 1996, a Canadian investor took over a failed 
coffee estate in the midlands. The old coffee estate had  
2 permanent water rights attached to the land: one water 
right is from Nduruma River (issued for Lambi 2 Furrow) 
and another from nearby Manyire River (issued for Lambi 
1 Furrow). Lambi 2 was already being used by the village 
of Manyire. Gomba Estate embarked upon a large operation 
to grow a diversity of crops – mainly vegetables and fruit 
trees. The downstream villages of Manyire, Nduruma, and 
Mlangarini immediately noticed the decrease in dry-season 
water supply when the farm became operational.
On behalf of the downstream villagers, the Nduruma River 
Committee attempted to meet with the Canadian to negotiate 
a water-rationing schedule. According to the village leaders of 
Manyire and Nduruma, ‘He wouldn’t attend any of the meet-
ings to discuss water allocation. We tried to levy fines on him 
for taking water at the wrong time but he refused to pay and 
wouldn’t let us in at the gate [of the estate].’ The Canadian’s 
reason for refusing to negotiate with the Nduruma Board was 
that he felt he had an ‘official’ legal right to the amount he had 
been allocated by Pangani Basin Water Board/Office (PBWO) 
and for which he paid an annual fee. He also felt uncomfortable 
establishing agreements with an unofficial organisation when 
it concerned the success of his estate. Explains the Canadian, 
‘What you end up with are guards with machetes watching 
your water intake to make sure you don’t open it too early. No 
one knows what is official or not. Inside the villages the vil-
lagers themselves steal the water – it is impossible to negotiate 
with that many people at once.’
For support of his claim, the Canadian called the District 
Commissioner and cited his official water right. In his words, 
‘All I would ask was, “Please apply the law.”’ Village leaders 
from Nduruma interpreted this behaviour as disrespectful and 
unaccommodating. The Canadian refused to solve anything 
without first calling the area Ward Councillor (Diwani). In the 
words of the village chairman of Nduruma, ‘The Canadian 
only knows 3 people: the area member of Parliament, the 
President, and the Minister of Investment. He was very rude; 
he wouldn’t attend the River Committee meetings.’ In response 
to the Canadian’s refusal to negotiate, many of the villagers 
responded with violence. Gomba’s furrow intakes were van-
dalised and its irrigation workers were harassed. According to 
the Canadian, these were common occurrences during the dry 
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season, ‘There were literally mobs of people with machetes at 
the intake from June to the end of February the following year.’ 
Gomba Estate stopped operation in 2007. The land of the estate 
now lies abandoned, but Manyire village regained control of 
Lambi 2 Furrow. 
Mediating local conflict: Enza Zaden’s role in Manyire 
water conflict
Enza Zaden is a Dutch-owned vegetable-seed breeding estate 
located along the Old Arusha-Moshi Road. In 2005, the com-
pany bought 45 acres of land that was once a coffee plantation 
known as Sarkos’s Farm. Although the estate has water rights 
to use both the Nduruma and Manyire Rivers, it doesn’t take 
any water from them because in the dry season there is not suf-
ficient water. Instead, the main supply comes from a borehole 
near Lake Duluti, 1 km upstream of the estate. This borehole 
has been registered with PBWO, for which the estate pays an 
annual fee. The estate has also drilled a second borehole for 
reasons of water security and claims to be in the process of 
registering it with PBWO. Enza employs 140 people on a per-
manent basis with an additional 40 temporarily hired to assist 
with the ongoing constructions on the farm. Almost all of these 
employees come from the downstream villages of Manyire and 
Nambala.
In early 2001 Nambala Village dug a new furrow from the 
Manyire River across the land now owned by Enza Zaden. At 
the time there was no agricultural activity taking place on this 
land. The furrow is called SANAKIMA, an acronym derived 
from the names of its users: Sarkos’s Farm, Nambala Village, 
Kikwe Village, and Maweni Village. Representatives from 
Nambala explained that this furrow was necessary because their 
main water source, the Ganana River, had dried up from overuse 
upstream. Nambala and Kikwe also claim to have been drawing 
water from Manyire River since 1978, at which time there were 
unofficial user agreements between the various village heads. 
Downstream of Enza’s estate and the SANAKIMA intake 
are the villages of Manyire, Karangai, and Maji Moto, with 
a total of 16 furrows which use the Manyire River as their 
source. The 7 furrows that support Manyire Village are: 
Majengo Juu, Majengo Kati, Mshikamano, King’ori, Kusini 
A, Kusini B, Levorosi, and Upendo. According to the chair-
man of the Manyire River Committee, representatives of 
the Board complained to PBWO about the construction of 
SANAKIMA furrow. He claims that PBWO, which does 
officially recognise the aforementioned 7 furrows, ordered 
the closing of SANAKIMA. Meanwhile, Nambala’s village 
committee claims that they are in the process of registering 
for an official water right with PBWO. A tenuous sharing 
agreement was agreed between the 2 parties concerning the 
times of opening and closing of the SANAKIMA furrow. 
However, there continued to be many disagreements between 
the members of the villagers – each side of the argument 
sent a full-time watchman to guard the furrow intake point 
on Enza Zaden’s property. On several occasions there were 
violent interactions involving machetes when one village 
accused another of either opening or closing the furrow at 
inappropriate times. The intake of SANAKIMA furrow was 
not fitted with cement lining or a control gate. This meant 
that water flow was controlled by the infilling of stones and 
soil excavated from the riverbank and from the nearby Enza 
Zaden farmland – a routine activity that contributed to the 
degradation of the source and the slow erosion of parts of 
Enza Zaden’s land. 
The managers of Enza Zaden became increasingly frus-
trated with the conflict situation. In addition to the harm being 
done to their land by trespassing villagers, the noise from the 
occasional brawl would wake up the manager and his family 
whose house is located near to the furrow intake. The manager 
of Enza Zaden met with representatives from each side and pro-
posed that the intake point itself be moved farther downstream, 
away from the estate house. In addition, Enza Zaden proposed 
to fund the construction of an intake weir. A second meeting 
was held with water representatives from Manyire, Nambala, 
Kikwe, and Maweni in attendance. The estate’s production 
manager facilitated the meeting. The previously agreed upon 
irrigation schedule was modified, put into a written contract, 
and signed on an Enza Zaden official letterhead. While prior 
to the agreement Nambala, Kikwe, and Maweni received 
water from 2 am to 3 pm, the current (dry season) schedule has 
reduced their allocation to the period between 6 am and 3 pm. 
On the part of Enza Zaden, the company agreed to finance the 
construction of a permanent intake structure.
According to Enza Zaden’s seed-cleaning manager, the 
villagers have so far stuck to the agreed furrow schedule; there 
have been no recent violent disputes over accusations of ‘intake 
gate’ tampering. Throughout this process Enza Zaden made no 
attempt to contact any level of the local government or PBWO, 
though both Manyire and Nambala claimed to have requested 
intervention of the district commissioner without response. 
When asked what the purpose of signing the contract was, both 
parties replied similarly. The villagers think that it affords them 
some ‘evidence of agreement’ against the other, though a local 
court is unlikely to consider this informal document bind-
ing. A member of the Manyire River Committee and resident 
of Manyire Village, claims that during a particularly heated 
encounter with Nambala furrow guards, he threatened to go 
to the police ‘with the signed document in hand.’ In response 
to this threat the men backed down. Villagers of Nambala, 
when asked for comment on the above anecdote explained that 
they understood that the document offered no real power of 
enforcement, ‘just the power of everyone signing.’ In return for 
its mediation role, Enza Zaden is treated like a relative by the 
villagers and many downstream farmers feel comfortable with 
the estate.
Negotiated allocation: Estates’ agreeing with the 
local River Committee
During the rainy season (March to May and November to 
December) the villagers only use furrows for supplemental 
irrigation, but they engage in full-scale irrigation during the 
dry season. The estates are able to meet their full irrigation 
demands during rainy seasons and high flows. However, dur-
ing the dry seasons, the Nduruma River Committee demands 
that all estates must reduce the time of their abstraction and 
the duration is negotiated every month. Most of the estates are 
active participants in the negotiation process and have repre-
sentatives who attend every meeting. These estates include 
Arusha Blooms, Kiliflora, Tanzania Flowers, Dekker Bruins 
and Old River estates. The estates often contribute small 
amounts of financial support for drinks and transportation of 
members of the River Committees. Dekker Bruins particularly 
has invested in a strong relationship with the River Committee: 
all monthly meetings are held on the property of the estate and 
for each meeting Dekker provides refreshments for the partici-
pants. The estate’s farm manager attributes this support to a 
necessity of cooperation. At the start of our research  
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(January 2009), the arrangement stipulated that the estates and 
the village of Mlangarini abstracted water from 6 am to  
4 pm. At 4 pm their gates are closed and the water is allowed 
to flow downstream into the open furrows of Nduruma Village 
and the other users below the Maruroi furrow. This rotational 
agreement was revised in February 2009 and estates’ schedule 
was from 5 am to 1 pm. To enforce this, the River Committee 
employs a water guard who patrols along the river, checking 
each and every intake of the large-scale irrigators. According 
to the Director of Arusha Blooms, the agreement with the River 
Committee during the dry season means that they don’t get 
enough water and the estates are forced to skip some irrigation 
schedules, which translate to an estimated 10% loss in produc-
tion. She stated that, over time, the problem is not water volume 
per se, but the lack of storage facility at the estate to maintain 
production during the dry season. The estates also negotiate 
between themselves. Arusha Blooms reported that they often 
send their representative (a Tanzanian national) to request 
additional time from the other estates and at times from the 
River Committee. The estate managers typically prefer to settle 
water concerns in this informal fashion without resorting to 
any outside authority (e.g., PBWO). Estates see their coopera-
tive agreement with the downstream smallholder farmers as an 
act of good neighbourliness, although they also admit to trying 
to address complaints that could tarnish the companies’ image 
internationally. The manager of Dekker Bruins stated explicitly 
during our interview, that to acquire a certification from The 
Netherlands they must be seen as working with the local com-
munities. The manager of Tanzania Flowers stated that because 
one of its farms is located on the boundary between the large-
scale irrigators and downstream smallholder farmers, they 
find themselves much more involved in the River Committee’s 
activities, while the other estates further upstream interact very 
little with the Board. The estates argue that their participation 
is an attempt to make downstream users understand that water 
use by the estate also generates benefits for the community 
downstream (e.g., employment opportunity, as well as schools 
and dispensaries constructed through their social responsibility 
projects).
However, the agreement is not without controversy. Some 
of the estates do not strictly abide by the River Committee’s 
decision on water allocation, and Kiliflora is one such estate. 
Kiliflora uses an electric pump to convey water directly from 
the river to its reservoirs instead of employing the traditional 
gravity-facilitated furrow method. Unlike the other foreign-
owned estates of similar size, Kiliflora irrigates using the 
relatively inefficient method of trough irrigation instead of 
drip. A trough is a U-shaped channel used to supply water and/
or nutrient solutions to potted plants. According to the estate’s 
fertigation officer, they run 2 pumps simultaneously, 6-8 hours 
a day, 7 days a week, between 5 am and 1 pm. There are also 
2 reservoirs located on the farms with storage capacities of 
65 000 m3 and 3 000 m3. Also in this case the Nduruma River 
Committee determines the hours when Kiliflora is allowed to 
operate its pumps – during the dry season of January 2009 its 
allocation had just been reduced by an hour. Kiliflora’s pumps 
are a matter of concern amongst the member of the River 
Committee and the downstream villagers whom they represent. 
In the fertigation officer’s words, ‘We spent most of the last 
meeting negotiating over when we could operate our pumps. 
People from the village don’t understand that we have a right 
to take this water.’ Representatives of the Board reported that 
Kiliflora often runs its pumps outside of its permitted time win-
dow and the irrigation managers of Arusha Blooms and Dekker 
Bruins corroborated this fact. However, the fertigation officer 
denies that Kiliflora has ever gone against the prescriptions 
of the Board. The fertigation officer however admitted that 
Kiliflora withdraws more water than its PBWO-granted water 
right allows. ‘Sometimes we take more and sometimes we 
take less, in the dry season we take more than the water right 
grants.’ He justifies this trespass by explaining, ‘We do struggle 
with water…we struggle to maintain production during the dry 
season.’ The efficacy of the Nduruma River Committee was 
reportedly tested when the water guards found Kiliflora oper-
ating its water pump at unsanctioned hours. Kiliflora, like all 
large-scale irrigators in the area, is surrounded by a high fence 
and employs a security guard at its gates. When the Board offi-
cials appeared at the estate to address this issue and collect the 
penalty, they weren’t allowed in or granted an audience with 
the Kiliflora manager. Several letters explaining the infraction 
were ignored. The fertigation officer did not acknowledge that 
these events took place and insisted that his company follows 
the mandates of the Board.
It seems that, in general, the estates that participate in 
the Nduruma River Committee think that the organisation is 
necessary for the region and are satisfied with its operation. 
The irrigation managers acknowledge that in the dry season 
water in the Nduruma River is insufficient to meet all demands. 
Dekker Bruins’ representative explains that it is much better to 
have a venue for people to discuss their needs and complaints 
than to resort to violence: 
‘There are more than 1 000 people downstream that need 
this same water. We cannot fight with them. In the past 
there was no discussion – machetes were always brought 
out whenever there were problems, but now the down-
stream villages are trying to organise.’ 
A common complaint voiced by several of the large-scale 
irrigators is that there is a lack of continuous Board activity 
throughout the whole year. They feel that the Board is too con-
cerned with matters of allocation and not concerned enough by 
longer-term issues, such as source maintenance.
Discussion
The Nduruma case illustrates the fact that sources of water 
rights are diverse, complex and often conflicting. It also high-
lights the issue that water rights do not arise solely from state 
laws, agencies and courts, but also from local institutions and 
views of other resource users. In Nduruma the question of 
legitimacy is at the centre of the water rights struggle. Water 
rights struggles in Nduruma conform to the 4 components of 
the water right analysis as proposed by Boelens (2008), but in 
a complex way. In this section we explore the dynamic of the 
Nduruma water right struggles. The order is for presentation 
only as the 4 components are involved simultaneously.
First, the competition over possession and use of resources 
in the sub-catchment dates back to colonial times. As described 
by Spear (1997), land ownership was a heavily contested 
matter by local Meru communities, colonial administration 
and European settlers throughout colonial times. The German 
and British colonists alienated land around the base of Mount 
Meru. The land and labour control struggle was only brought 
to a close when the Meru people protested and appealed to the 
United Nations against British seizure of more land (see Spear, 
1997). The induced land inequities however still shape present-
day struggles over who gets access to water; the competition is 
at its most intense between the large-scale irrigators (midland) 
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and the downstream smallholder farmers. In their midland 
position, the estates are sandwiched between smallholders 
farmers who are located both upstream and downstream of the 
sub-catchment. Hence, the estates are both advantaged and 
disadvantaged in terms of hydraulic location. 
At the second level is the contest over the content of water 
rights and its enforcement. Large-scale irrigators have loca-
tion advantage over the downstream farmers, and from their 
international origin, they also have better access to other 
resources (e.g., knowledge, better irrigation technology and 
financial means). Estates also benefit from a close connection 
with a national government which is interested in encouraging 
foreign investment. The estates also claim water access based 
on state-issued water rights, which are labelled ‘official’ and 
therefore legitimate. Hence, in their midstream location, the 
estates may be considered more powerful. The estates’ water 
allocation, especially during dry seasons, does not go unchal-
lenged by the downstream smallholder farmers. These farmers 
demanded that allocation should be rotational and take into 
account supply variability and not absolute values specified 
in the government water right. Most estates in the midstream 
engage in negotiations with the smallholder farmers and tend to 
agree on a time-based allocation during scarcity even when this 
implies loss of production. 
This research found that the most successful large-scale 
irrigators are those able to engage with local systems of 
negotiation and rotational water allocations. By adopting this 
strategy, the estates not only avoid conflict with the local farm-
ers, but also gain social reputation in the area, increasing the 
chance of cooperation from the farmers towards their hydraulic 
infrastructure investments. The main reasons for negotiation, 
according to their representatives, are that it is: 
• much better to have a venue for people to discuss and com-
plain than to resort to violence; 
• a matter of water security; and 
• an organised front that can forcefully represent their 
interest at a larger scale (catchment-wide or to the Pangani 
Basin Water Office). 
Their cooperation seems to fit the argument that the larger 
one’s stake, the larger one’s interest in the common good and 
thus the more responsibly one may act (Van der Zaag, 2007). 
Violent response by the smallholder farmers on estates’ water 
infrastructure is sufficient incentive for the estates to cooperate 
and broker cooperative and equitable deals. This is illustrated 
by the case of Enza Zaden Estate stepping in to mediate water 
conflict between 2 villages. In return for its help, it gains 
respect of the villages. Gomba Estate, by contrast, provides a 
situation where non-cooperative behaviour led to self-destruc-
tion in the long run, as the estate was forced out of business 
with lack of water being a major factor.
At the third level, regulatory control, the paper has shown 
that this power is largely exercised by the Nduruma River 
Committee, which claims to have legitimate decision-making 
authority and takes responsibility for allocating water between 
midland and lowland farmers. This cooperative arrangement 
seems to only work well between close neighbours; at larger 
spatial distance it is less effective. The major weakness of 
the Nduruma River Committee is that its membership only 
encompasses large-scale irrigators and the downstream users. 
The Board is simply managing water the upstream villages 
were unable to use. Since highland farmers do not have river 
committees, it is difficult for the Nduruma River Committee to 
engage with them. 
The fourth level, dealing with regime of representation is 
best described by the water management perspectives of the 
different levels of government. The national government is 
interested in enforcing statutory water policies, laws and hier-
archies, as well as promoting foreign commercial investment. 
However, the local district administrations are more likely to 
spend their limited resources ‘keeping the peace’, rather than 
enforcing the letter of the water law. Estates that refuse to 
cooperate with smallholder farmers are often told by district 
administrators to go back and negotiate with their neighbours.
Conclusions
This paper has described how water access is negotiated 
between smallholder irrigators and large-scale irrigators shar-
ing the water of Nduruma River, Upper Pangani River Basin, 
Tanzania. The spatial geography of Nduruma is such that 
smallholder farmers are located upstream and downstream, 
while large-scale irrigators are in the midstream part of the 
sub-catchment. There is not enough water in the river to satisfy 
all demands. The majority of the smallholder farmers currently 
access water under local arrangements, while large-scale irri-
gators have obtained state-issued water use permits.
Although in such a context one would expect the weaker 
downstream farmers to lose out, instead cooperation prevails. 
Smallholder farmers in the sub-catchment counter inequities 
in land and water distribution by enforcing suitable allocation 
proxies (proportional division, time-based turns) which make 
water rights more meaningful. Powerful estates that do not 
agree to the terms of the local agreements find it difficult to 
keep on operating, as their water infrastructure may be vandal-
ised by smallholder irrigators. In addition, local government 
officials pay little attention to the pleas by estates, thereby leav-
ing the smallholder farmers with sufficient autonomy (see also: 
Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). 
The case study shows that a River Committee, an institu-
tion that was locally established and engineered and that is 
not formally recognised in statute law in Tanzania, has been 
conducive in structuring water allocation in a manner that has 
been effective and that has forestalled major conflicts. The 
institutional form of a River Committee has thus bridged local 
rules and statute law with respect to water.
We find the most successful estates are those able to coop-
erate with the smallholder farmers. The risk of the estates to 
lose a lot is here sufficient incentive for them to cooperate and 
broker cooperative and equitable deals with their less powerful 
counterparts (cf. Baland and Platteau, 1999). In such a situation 
it becomes less easy for the many small water users to defect. 
But cooperative behaviour by the estates may also be due to 
other interdependencies between them and the smallholder 
farmers. Large-scale irrigators have to engage with their down-
stream villages because of their dependence on local labour. In 
addition, cooperation with smallholder farmers helps reinforce 
the water claim of the estates at larger spatial scales. However, 
this case study also shows that at the larger catchment scale it 
has so far been impossible to institute and maintain effective 
cooperative arrangements, despite the formally established 
structures.
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